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Since its economic reform and opening to the outside, China has experienced 
impressive economic development. Between 1978 and 2004, China’s annual GDP 
growth rate averaged 9.4%, far above the world average of 2.8%.    Economic growth 
has been accompanied by rapid urbanization.    In 1978, only 17.9% of China’s 
population lived in urban areas; by 2003, the urbanization rate was 40.5%. 
 
Although the urban infrastructure capital stock also has expanded 
swiftly—probably faster than anywhere else in the world--it has not kept pace with 
the rate of industrialization and urbanization. Until recently, China’s urban 
infrastructure financing was heavily dependent on the fiscal budget.    Fiscal capacity 
constraints, especially in the lower levels of government, have forced governmental 
authorities to make greater use of borrowing, introducing a new degree of risk into 
intergovernmental finance, but urban infrastructure construction continues to lag 
behind the rate that many experts believe is required to sustain China’s extraordinary 
economic growth. 
 
To analyze the impact of the fiscal framework on urban infrastructure 
financing, we need first to understand the outline of China’s fiscal system.    This 
chapter summarizes the principal reforms that have led to today’s fiscal framework, 
then considers the current situation and future options for urban infrastructure finance. 
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PART I 
CHINA’S FISCAL SYSTEM AND THE CHANGE OF FISCAL 
POLICY 
China’s market-oriented economic reforms started in 1978.    The nation 
gradually phased out the planned economic system, and shifted economic power to 
decentralized levels of government and companies. Reform of the fiscal system thus 
underlies national economic reform.   
 
The pre-reform fiscal pattern 
 
The pre-reform fiscal regime of China was adapted to the highly concentrated 
planning economy.    Not only did the government do everything, but sub-national 
governments were totally dependent on the central government. It was a typical 
regulated fiscal regime, in which all taxes and profits were remitted to the center and 
then transferred back to the provinces and from there to the local level.
2 
Policymakers in the central government decided what type of revenues should be 
collected and how these revenues were to be reallocated for national and sub-national 
public goods. 
 
The pre-reform fiscal regime had the merit of generating broadly equal fiscal 
capacity among different regions. However, it provided no incentives for sub-national 
                                                        
2  In China, the term “local” is commonly used to describe all sub-national units of government. In this 
chapter, “local” refers to sub-provincial units, including municipalities, townships, and counties.    4  
governments to promote economic growth or collect budgetary revenues. 
 
The Fiscal Contracting System: 1980-1993 
 
China began its fiscal decentralization reform in earnest in 1980, with the goal 
of giving sub national governments more and more power to finance their own needs 
subject to a budget constraint. The initial strategy involved a variety of contracting 
methods, whose basic spirit was to apportion revenues and expenditures between the 
central and local authorities while holding the latter responsible for their own profits 
and losses. The fiscal contracting system gradually evolved into 6 contracting 
categories by 1988—viz. contract sharing of incremental revenues, proportional 
sharing of base revenue, proportional base sharing plus incremental sharing, 
contractually designated incremental remittance amounts, fixed remittance, and fixed 
central subsidy. 
 
The fiscal contracting system gave sub-national governments a certain space 
to decide their own affairs (a kind of fiscal deregulation), encouraging them to 
develop the regional economy and collect revenues. From a national perspective, the 
system had two principal drawbacks.      First, it caused the central government share 
of fiscal revenues to decline steeply.    This phenomenon was due in part to the fact 
that provincial and municipal governments “gamed” the system by producing just 
enough on-budget shared revenue to satisfy their contract obligations, while shifting    5  
further revenue generation to off-budget and other revenue sources that did not have 
to be shared.    Central government revenue as a percentage of total fiscal revenue fell 
from 34.8% in 1985 to 22% in 1992.    Second, the different contracting methods 
were complicated and inequitable, enlarging the fiscal differentials between regions. 
Rich provinces (such as Guangdong) had more bargaining power, and benefited from 
more favorable fiscal contracts. In addition, under the contracting system, the central 
government fell into an inefficient track of constantly bargaining with sub-national 
governments over revenue-sharing terms. 
 
“Tax assignment system” reform of 1994 
 
In 1994, China undertook a fundamental intergovernmental fiscal reform 
called the tax assignment system reform. The objectives of the reform package were 
to: (1) simplify and rationalize the tax structure by reducing tax categories and tax 
rates thereby unifying the tax burden on taxpayers, and cutting down tax exemptions; 
(2) raise the overall fiscal revenue-to-GDP ratio; (3) raise the central government’s 
share of total fiscal revenues; and (4) put central-local revenue sharing on a more 
transparent, objective basis by shifting from revenue-sharing contract negotiations to 
a tax and revenue assignment system. 
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Expenditure assignments between the central and sub-national 
governments 
 
    The 1994 reforms concentrated solely on the revenue side of public budgets. 
No expenditure assignments were made.    In fact, there still is no legislation in China 
that codifies the expenditure responsibilities of different tiers of government, either 
between the Central and Provincial level, or between Provinces and the Local level.   
Leaving intergovernmental expenditure responsibilities undefined has given upper tier 
governments more flexibility of offloading responsibilities to lower tiers, without 
compensatory transfers of revenue or fiscal autonomy. 
 
Table 1 identifies the key expenditure functions commonly understood to be 
sub-national functions.    The list is extensive and costly.    Most of the service 
delivery functions, along with the corresponding investment in urban infrastructure, 
are the responsibilities of local governments.    The local level is also responsible for 
economic development and economic planning—which involves pro-active direction 
of the local enterprise sector.    Local governments in China also have much greater 
responsibility for poverty alleviation and social protection of displaced workers than 
is true in the West, where these functions are assumed primarily by central 
government. 
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Table 1: Sub-National Expenditure Responsibilities 
Sub-national government administration 
Local Capital Construction 
Basic local services, including water supply and distribution, local and regional roads, 
and highways, wastewater collection and treatment, garbage collection and 
disposal; urban gas supply; mass transit 
Maintenance, repair, and operation of urban infrastructure 
Management of local State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
Expenditure for Supporting Agricultural Production   
Primary and secondary schooling; large portion of higher education 
Health care and hospitals 
Price Subsidies 
Poverty alleviation 
Protection of laid-off workers from SOEs 
Cultural and heritage protection 
Environmental protection 
Local and regional economic development 
Physical planning 




  The principle of revenue assignment between the central and sub-national 
governments is that taxes concerning national interest or macroeconomic adjustment 
belong to the central government and those with regard to local economic 
development are under the jurisdiction of sub-national governments. Table 2 shows 
the specific situation after the 1994 reform. 
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Income Taxes and Profits of SOEs under the jurisdiction of the central government 
Import-related consumption taxes and VATs 
Taxes imposed on banks, nonbank financial institutions and insurance companies 
(include business taxes, income taxes, and Urban Maintenance and Development 
Tax) 
Taxes on railroads. 
Sub-national 
Revenues 
Business Tax (excluding banks, nonbank financial institutions and insurance 
companies, and railroads) 
Company Income Tax (excluding local banks, foreign banks, and nonbank financial 
companies) 
Profits of locally owned SOEs 
Personal Income Tax 
Urban Land Use Tax 
Urban Maintenance and Development Tax (excluding banks, nonblank financial 
institutions and insurance companies, and railroads) 
Fixed Assets Capital Gains Tax 
House property taxes 
Stamp taxes 
Agriculture and Related Taxes 
Tax on Contracts 
Land value increment taxes 
Shared  
Revenues 
Value Added Taxes (the central 75%, sub-national governments 25%) 
Stamp Taxes on Security Exchange (50%-50%) 
Resource Taxes   
Source : Author   
  A distinctive characteristic of this revenue assignment was that, while it 
initially boosted significantly the central government’s share of total revenue (see 
below), it assigned to sub-national governments all or part of what turned out to be the 
fastest-growing major revenue sources—100% of the personal income tax, most of 
the company income tax, and 25% of VAT. 
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Central-to-sub-national transfer system   
 
The intergovernmental fiscal reform also defined a new intergovernmental 
transfer system.    What is called “tax rebating” from the central to sub-national 
governments is actually a kind of transfer payment, a grant paid to provinces in 
relation to the growth in certain tax revenues since the last pre-reform year, 1993. 
Revenue increments from the consumption tax and value-added tax collected in a 
province are received by central government, then up to 30% is “rebated” to the 
province in the form of a tax-related return grant. 
 
A second type of transfer from the center was introduced.    This is a 
formula-based grant based on the gap between a province’s ‘standardized’ fiscal 
expenditure and its ‘standardized’ fiscal revenue. All central transfers are made to 
provincial governments.    The provinces then transfer revenues to the local level, 
generally following grant arrangements modeled after the central-to-provincial 
design.  
 
General tax reform   
 
These changes in the intergovernmental fiscal system were made within the 
context of a general overhaul of the tax system.    The most dramatic changes were 
establishment of a VAT-dominated turnover tax system, and unification of the various    10   
elements of domestic income tax.    The tax changes had the objective of increasing 
total fiscal revenues, assuring future growth of fiscal revenues in line with economic 
growth, and increasing the central government share of fiscal revenues. To ensure 
effective collection of the central government’s portion of revenues, the central and 
sub-national governmental tax collection bureaus were separated. The national tax 
collection bureau now is in charge of collecting revenues from tax sources that are the 
exclusive domain of the central government, as well as revenues from shared taxes, 
while the local tax bureaus are in charge of collecting sub-national tax revenues. 
 
  Changes in revenue rules after 1994 
  
  After 1994, further changes in the intergovernmental revenue system have 
been made, but more gradually.    Most of the changes have taken the form of 
increasing central government’s portion of shared revenues, increasing tax rates on 
centrally collected taxes, or eliminating various sub-national taxes and fees.   
 
  First, in 1997, the sharing proportion of the revenue from Stamp Taxes on 
Security Exchange between the central and local governments was changed from 
50%-50% to 88%-12%. Later, the sharing ratio was again adjusted, moving gradually 
from 88%-12% to 97%-3%. 
 
  Second, the company tax rate on the finance and insurance industry was    11  
increased from 5% to 8%, with all of the increase going to the central government. 
(The tax rate was reduced to the original level (5%) between 2001 and 2003, because 
of the economic slowdown.) 
 
  Third, income tax revenue-sharing was introduced in 2002. Except for some 
special industries and companies (such as banks, China Gas Company, and China Oil 
and Chemical Company), the tax-sharing arrangement provided that central and 
sub-national governments would in the future share the combined revenues of 
company (business) income taxes and personal income taxes. The local governments 
would keep the income tax revenues collected in 2001 as a base, but increases would 
be shared between central and local governments. In 2002, the central government 
sharing rate was introduced at 50%.    From 2003 to now, the central government’s 
sharing rate has been 60%.    This change has had the effect of converting the 
fastest-growing significant sources of tax revenue—the company and personal income 
taxes—from sub-national taxes to shared taxes, the majority of whose revenue goes to 
the central government. 
 
  Fourth, starting from 2004, the government announced that China will 
progressively abolish the agriculture tax system over the next 5 years in order to 
lighten the farmers’ tax burden. Several provinces have already totally eliminated the 
agricultural tax, while other provinces have lowered the agriculture tax rate from 3% 
to 1%. To partially compensate for the lost sub-national revenue, the central    12   
government increased special transfer payments by RMB 9.1 billion as budget-gap 
coverage. 
 
  Finally, from 1997 until now, the central government has issued a series of 
documents to cancel, regulate, or limit the fees and user charges that can be collected 
at the sub-national (mostly urban) level. 
 
Generally speaking, the tax assignment reform established a new fiscal 
framework for China. It set up a better-defined and rational arrangement of 
inter-governmental financing. The new system enables all levels of government to 
have their own exclusive revenue sources, clarifying the boundaries of revenue 
allocation between different levels. A formula-based transfer system was introduced.   
As was intended, the tax assignment system gives sub-national governments more 
power to develop their economies, and to collect their own taxes. 
 
The reforms carried out since 1994, however, have caused sub national 
governments a great deal of fiscal difficulty.    They have re-centralized fiscal 
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THE REVENUE IMPACT OF FISCAL REFORM   
 
The 1994 fiscal reform had the desired effect of accelerating fiscal revenue 
collection.    Before 1994, total fiscal revenue was growing between RMB 20 and 30 
billion annually. After 1994, the annual fiscal revenue growth increased to more than 
RMB 150 billion on average. Figure 1 shows the trend of China’s fiscal revenue. 
Figure 1: China’s fiscal revenue and its structure 
 
Source : Authors calculations 
The 1994 reform also had the intended effect of shifting fiscal revenues from 
sub-national governments to the central government.    This impact can be seen 
clearly in Figure 1, where central revenues jump ahead of sub-national revenues for 
the first time in 1994.    Subsequent changes in revenue-sharing rules have assured 
that central-government fiscal revenues continue to grow faster than sub-national 
fiscal revenues. Under the fiscal contracting system, the sub-national share of total 
fiscal revenue was very high, reaching a peak of 78.9% in 1993.      After 1994, due to 
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portion of shared taxes, the sub-national governmental revenue share steadily declined 
from 78% in 1993 to 45% in 2002. The tax assignment system has cut sharply into 
sub-national governments’ own revenues and their share of fiscal revenue distribution. 
 
On the expenditure side of budgets, however, the share of sub-national 
government spending in total fiscal expenditure has kept stable, at roughly 70% (see 
Figure 2). 














































Source : Authors calculations 
The widening fiscal gap between sub-national expenditure and sub-national 
fiscal revenue is shown dramatically in Figure 3.    As a result of these trends, 
sub-national governments have grown more and more fiscally dependent on the 
central government. The tax rebating system has become a type of universal grant, 
which all sub-national governments need to receive.    At the same time, regional 
disparities in income, fiscal revenue, and self-financing capacity have grown.    Figure 
4 shows that the sub-national ‘self-support’ rate ranges from almost 90% in Beijing to    15   
less than 40% in Qinghai (Tibet may be viewed as an exceptional case.) 
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Note: The fiscal self-support rate is the share of own-source revenue in total revenue. 
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THE TRANSFER SYSTEM FROM CENTRAL TO SUB NATIONAL 
LEVEL 
Under the present fiscal system in China, transfer payments from central to 
sub-national governments are important, but quantitatively they do not offset the 
widening disparity in own-source revenue collection and qualitatively they do not 
fully incorporate the new norm of a formula-based standardized system. Reforms in 
the transfer system have been hampered by the political/economic power of 
high-growth regions.    The largest part of intergovernmental transfers is still based on 
incremental revenue sharing (tax rebating) relative to 1993 base-year receipts. 
 
The tax rebating system   
 
After the 1994 reform, in order to compensate sub-national governments’ 
revenue losses, the central government introduced the tax rebating system described 
above. The tax revenue rebating scale is decided directly by: first, upwardly 
transferring the amount that was transferred by sub-national governments to the center 
in 1993; second, the overall incremental revenue growth of VAT and Consumption tax 
revenue is computed; third, it is determined whether or not revenue collected within a 
particular province is at least as large as in 1993. Provinces that meet this hurdle 
receive tax rebates.    The rebate system is scaled so as to enable the richer provinces 
to get more tax rebating, expanding fiscal disparities among regions. 
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The “standardized” fiscal transfer system: 
 
In 1995, a new “standardized” transfer system was introduced in addition to 
the above-described rebate system. Based on formula, the new system aimed to 
establish an objective, normative transfer mechanism. The amount of funds disbursed 
under the standardized transfer system has grown continually, from RMB 2.1 billion 
in 1995 to 74.5 billion in 2004, but the transfer amount under this method is still small 
compared to the magnitude of tax rebating. 
 
Up to now, the formula for the standardized fiscal transfer has been very 
simple and unstable.    For example, the formula in 2002 was: The volume of transfer 
payment of province N = (the N regional standardized expenditure – the N regional 
standardized revenue)  ×  the transfer coefficient of province N. Only when the 
standardized expenditure is larger than the standardized revenue could the province N 
obtain fiscal aid (net transfer payment). 
 
Standardized revenues are calculated according to the regional tax base and 
the tax rates for sub-national and shared taxes.    Since all tax rates are set at the 
national level, differences in standardized revenue reflect differences in tax base 
capacity.  Standardized  expenditure  is  mainly the sum of a province’s expenditures 
for government employees, education, and administration, all calculated at 
“standardized” rates (e.g., a standard number of public employees per 1000    18   
population.) The transfer coefficient for a particular province is calculated taking 
account of the regional standardized expenditure, standardized revenue, the situation 
of fiscal deficit, and the overall pool available for transfer payment. So the transfer 
coefficient is flexible year by year.    Provinces cannot accurately project their transfer 
receipts in advance, nor can they calculate the impact on transfers of the budget 
adjustments they make. 
 
Municipalities and other sub-provincial governments are subject to the same 
type of transfer formula at the provincial level, and the same uncertainty surrounding 
transfer amount. 
 
Earmarked grants   
 
Aside from the two transfer systems, there still are earmarked grants. 
In 1999, a transfer for income distribution adjustment was introduced when 
the central government decided to increase the middle and the lower classes’ income. 
The transfer was earmarked for income distribution and excluded some rich areas, 
such as Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, and Shandong. The 
transfer amount in 1999 was RMB 10.8 billion, doubled in 2000, and reached 40.3 
billions in 2001. 
 
Further earmarking grants were introduced in conjunction with China’s    19   
western economic development program.      For example, the transfer payment 
earmarked for minority areas was established in 2000 in order to support the minority 
areas’ economic development.    Similar grants are now being earmarked for 
re-development of China’s rustbelt region in the Northeast.   
Table 3 summarizes the overall transfer payment structure in China in recent 
years. 
Table 3: 1995－2004 Transfer payment from the central to sub national level   
Fiscal  year  1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total  2449  2655   2784  3228  3931  4588  5893  7348  8656  10177 
Tax rebating and 
fixed subsidy amounts  1982  2060   2124  2196  2234  2326  2431  3328  4196  4335 
Transfer payments for   
fiscal capacity  91   107   143  155  336  506  1108  1586  1884  2618 
Of which:： 
Standardized fiscal transfer  20   35   50   61   75   85   138   279   380  745  
Earmarked for minority areas.            25   35   39   55   76  
Income distribution adjustment.          108  217  631   817   901  993  
Grant for “fees and 
tax reform”  in rural 
area               80   245   305  307  
Grant for abolition 
of agriculture tax                      217  
                   
              
Special transfer payments  375   489   518  878  1360  1756  2355  2434  2577  3223 
Source：Calculations using “Finance Yearbook of China” from 1996 to 2005. Units = (100 million) 
Note:    sub-items do not add to category total because of exclusion of minor items.    20   
To recapitulate: the present transfer system consists mainly of the tax rebating 
program and earmarked grants. The general transfer payment that was intended to 
narrow the standardized fiscal gap between provinces accounts for only about a 
quarter of total transfers, though its relative importance has been growing since it was 
introduced in 1995. Taken as a whole, the present transfer system does not fulfill the 
fundamental purpose of reducing fiscal disparities while providing effective 
incentives to responsible local fiscal management.    Future reforms should expand the 
size of the standardized transfer relative to tax rebating and earmarking. 
 
FISCAL DISPARITY IN CHINA 
 
In recent years, a big problem that has emerged is the increasing fiscal 
disparity among regions.    Regional inequalities have hindered harmonious economic 
development. Table 4 shows the situation in six provinces, ranging from the eastern 
coastal zone to the western areas of China. Fiscal disparities among the six areas have 
been continually growing. For example, in 2001, the wealthiest province (Shanghai) 
had per capita fiscal capacity of RMB 3776; the lowest (Guizhou) had only RMB 
262.6. 1n 2003, the highest one (Shanghai) had fiscal capacity of RMB 5180 per 
capita, the lowest one (Guizhou) had 321.8. In other words, the fiscal disparity 
between the wealthiest and poorest province was more than 15 times. The overall 
fiscal disparity coefficient grew steadily between 1995 and 2003.    Most of the 
economically developed and fiscally strong provinces are located in the eastern    21   
coastal area. 
 
Table 4 Fiscal disparity among provinces (RMB/person) 
 Year 
Province 































































1.069  1.104  1.133  1.134  1.131  1.153  1.16  1.21  1.24 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook from 1995 to 2004. The disparity coefficient is the standard 
deviation divided by the arithmetic mean. 
 
The mismatch of governmental function and fiscal capacity among 
different levels 
 
  Another type of fiscal disparity is that between higher levels of government 
and lower tiers. 
The reform of 1994 and its aftermath shifted fiscal revenues upward to the center. At    22   
the same time, higher levels, such as the central and the provincial governments, 
managed to shift expenditure responsibilities down to the basic levels, such as 
counties and townships. This has caused a mismatch between function and fiscal 
capacity at different levels. 
 
In China, sub-provincial governments include city, county, and township 
governments. The sub-provincial fiscal situation outside of the big cities has become 
very difficult. The fiscal problems of basic levels of government have been 
exacerbated by the tendency of provincial governments to retain a high share of the 
revenues generated within the province.    For example, the per capita fiscal revenue 
of Yunnan provincial government is 11 times greater than the per capita revenue of the 
county governments. Guangdong’s per capita provincial revenue is 7 times greater 
than the counties’—despite the fact that much of the burden for service delivery and 
social welfare protection falls on the counties. 
 
  From a national perspective, the two highest levels of sub-national 
government (provincial governments and city or administrative regions) account for 
about 70% of all sub-national fiscal revenue, while the lower two levels (county and 
township) only have 30%. Meanwhile, the sub-provincial transfer payment system 
still is not efficiently established. Because of this skewed fiscal revenue distribution, 
the fiscal capacity of the base levels of local government, outside the biggest cities, 
has worsened and worsened.    23   
 
Nowadays, the county and township governments undertake too many 
responsibilities. Some of these functions, such as compulsory education, militiaman 
training, social security, agricultural support, family planning, environmental 
protection, and poverty alleviation, should be assigned to higher-level level 
governments, especially the central government. Because of their excessive functional 
responsibilities, the basic levels of local government lack enough money to do the 
essential things that they should do.   
 
FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND LOCAL AUTONOMY 
 
Thus far, we have considered the fiscal flows resulting from tax-sharing and 
transfer arrangements.    At least as important to the fiscal framework, and the impact 
on urban infrastructure finance, are the systems of intergovernmental hierarchy and 
the policies of central fiscal management. 
 
Limited Sub-National Autonomy 
 
At present, China maintains a multi-layer budget system, in which each level 
of government is responsible for its own budget.    The People’s Congresses at each 
level are formally responsible for budgetary legislation and approval.    Budgets are 
not submitted to higher-level governments for approval.    Each level of government    24   
does, however report its budget and budget execution to the next level, and is 
responsible for conforming to budget rules. 
 
In practice, the intergovernmental fiscal system is a blend of rules-based 
decentralization and hierarchical oversight that is a legacy of centralized planning.   
The Budget Law establishes fiscal limits for each tier of sub-national government.   
All sub-national governments are prohibited from having deficits, issuing bonds, or 
borrowing.    Tax rates for all sub-national taxes are established at the central level; 
sub-national governments do not have the flexibility of modifying tax rates or 
introducing new forms of taxation. 
 
A detailed reporting system is applied upward through the governmental 
hierarchy.    The Economic Development and Reform Commission (formerly 
Planning Commission) at each level specifies in each five-year plan the physical 
development targets that the government will achieve, along with targets for local 
investment, economic growth rates and revenue collection.    These targets reflect 
goals established at the national level and communicated downward to sub-national 
governments.    Progress toward targets is closely monitored, both within the 
governmental system and within the parallel Communist party hierarchy.    The 
political system abundantly rewards local leadership for achieving or exceeding goals, 
especially those referring to investment levels, physical development and economic 
growth reflected in fiscal revenue.    25   
 
Layered on top of this hierarchical structure and limited local autonomy is a 
countervailing tendency, distinctive to China, that is a legacy from the contracting 
period of decentralization (during the 1980s and 1990s up to the reforms started in 
1994).    This is the “off-budget fiscal fund” and a variety of other off-budget local 
resources.    The off-budget thrust gained momentum during the period of contractual 
revenue sharing, when local and provincial governments had to share their budgetary 
revenues with higher levels of government according to contractual terms.   
Sub-national governments, especially those at the local level, responded by 
introducing a large number of special fees, special charges, and revenues realized 
from land leasing, which were not shared with, and often not reported to, higher-level 
governments.    It is difficult to obtain exact information on the scale of these 
off-budget and other revenues, since one of the purposes behind the arrangement is to 
carve out revenue sources for which local authorities are not upwardly accountable.   
However, a special study of Beijing’s revenue structure illustrates the scale of the 
problem. 
Table 5: Structure of Beijing Municipal Revenue 
Year 1998 1999 2000 
On-Budget Revenue  39.4%  45.2%  47.4% 
Formal “Off Budget” 
Revenue 
18.2% 18.0% 20.3% 
Other Revenue  42.4%  36.8%  32.3%    26   
Source:    Cited in Zhang Rufei and Chreod Ltd., Shanghai Case Study, Report Prepared for Fiscal 
Systems and Sub-National Growth Project, World Bank (2005) 
 
The national government has sought to cut back the amount of non-reported 
revenues, first by greatly restricting the variety of fees that local governments can 
impose, on the grounds that many of the fees were “illegally” adopted and interfere 
with predictable business investment, and, secondly, by requiring local governments 
to report revenue from the list of authorized fees and some land leasing under a 
formal category of “off-budget revenue.” These initiatives have reduced the 
magnitude of unaccounted-for local revenue, but not eliminated it.    Table 5 shows 
the modest progress being made toward reducing “other,” largely unreported revenue, 
 
The question of budget organization and re-structuring is especially important 
to infrastructure financing, given that the largest part of financing has come from the 
proceeds of land leasing, fees, and asset income, which lie outside the regular local 
budget.    The category, “fees”, is a composite of user-fees for services like water 
supply and a wide variety of more arbitrary fees imposed by local governments to 
generate revenue.    At least until the most recent round of reforms, service-related 
user fees were a small part of the total. 
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From Pro-Active to Prudent Fiscal Policy 
 
Macroeconomic fiscal policy is established at the national level, under the 
guidance of the Ministry of Finance.    An important shift in policy occurred in 2004, 
which has affected all parts of China’s economy, but especially infrastructure finance. 
 
After years of implementing a “proactive” fiscal policy—i.e., one of fiscal 
stimulus and economic development financed by borrowing—China in 2004 formally 
adopted a “prudent” fiscal policy—one of greater fiscal restraint with less reliance on 
borrowing.    The pro-active policy was adopted largely in response to the Asian 
financial crisis, for the purpose of stimulating national growth.    As the economy 
shook off the shadow of economic recession and entered into the rising phase of a 
new cycle, certain stresses became apparent in the latter half of 2003, such as 
overinvestment in some sectors like steel and inflationary pressures. 
 
The content of the new “prudent” fiscal policy, announced at the National 
Peoples Congress, can be summarized as (i) controlling deficits and national 
borrowing, (ii) focusing fiscal resources on sectors that have critical bottlenecks or 
have lagged behind in the emphasis on general economic growth; these include 
agriculture, environmental protection and social protection of laid-off workers from 
State Owned Enterprises; (iii) devoting more attention to the fiscal impact on income    28   
distribution, including income differences between regions and between the rural and 
urban sectors; and (iv) reinforcing tax collection and budgetary management, in order 
to finance these initiatives within more nearly balanced budgets. 
 
In terms of economic development strategy, this program has been called the 
“five balances”—that is, the need to balance urban and rural development, to balance 
the development of different geographical regions, to balance economic and social 
development, to balance the development of man and nature (environment), and to 
balance domestic development with international trade.    One of the first steps in 
implementing “prudent” national fiscal policy was to lower the target for the 2005 
central deficit. 
 
Identifying and Managing Fiscal Risk 
 
The move to “prudent” macroeconomic fiscal policy reflects the judgment that 
the greatest fiscal risk to China’s sustained development now is public sector debt, as 
reflected both in the balance sheets of government, and in the balance sheets of banks 
and the financial sector.    The national (central government) debt has grown to some 
RMB 2.1 trillion or about 60% of GDP in 2005.     
 
Non-performing loans threaten the domestic banking sector.    The government 
already has relieved the banking sector of a large volume of non-performing loans, by    29   
forming special asset companies to assume these loans and the underlying assets.   
Still, the government estimates that some 3.3 trillion of non-performing loans remain, 
and some outside analysts project that the share of non-performing loans is 
considerably higher.    A large part of the bad debt consists of loans to sub-national 
governments and to local State-Owned Enterprises. 
 
There is no exact information on the aggregate volume of bad debt owed by 
sub-national governments.
3    However, the total of direct non-performing loans, plus 
uncovered contingent liabilities, is likely to lie somewhere between RMB 800 billion 
and 1.2 trillion.    This makes sub-national governments a very large part of the 
banking sector’s aggregate debt problem.    The issue of banks’ bad debt takes on 
special urgency because of the WTO agreement allowing entry of foreign banks into 
domestic lending, which will bring well-financed new entrants into competition with 
China’s domestic banks.    In addition to offloading some of the banking sector’s bad 
loans, the government has ordered banks to adopt much stricter lending standards for 
local governments and locally owned state owned enterprises. 
 
Finally, under current intergovernmental expenditure responsibilities, 
sub-national governments will have to absorb a large part of the unfunded social 
                                                        
3 Local governments technically are prohibited from borrowing.  Borrowing is done on their behalf 
by special enterprises wholly owned by the local government, called Urban Development and 
Investment Companies (UDICs), which are the juridical holders of all local development assets and 
liabilities.  However, these companies execute municipal government policy, report to the municipal 
government, and are owned by the municipal government.  Banks typically require a municipal 
“comfort letter” backing UDIC loans.  This states that the municipal government will do whatever it 
can to ensure that the UDIC is able repay its loans.    30   
security liability, which is estimated at some RMB 2.5 trillion.    In all, public debt 
might account for more than 280% of GDP in 2005, threatening China’s future 
economic development if not handled prudently. 
 
All of these factors point to the macroeconomic risk involved in increasing 
sub-national governments’ debt by financing the large volume of urban infrastructure 
investment that is needed through borrowing.    This is especially true if infrastructure 
investment is to be focused on laggard regions, and counties and townships, whose 
capacity to repay debt is limited.    31   
 
 PART II 
IMPACT OF THE FISCAL FRAMEWORK ON URBAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT 
 
Ever since the early 1990s, China’s urban public infrastructure has drawn great 
attention from all levels of governments.      Investment has been climbing at a rapid 
rate.  Total  urban  infrastructure  investment during the “Eighth Five Year Plan” 
Period was RMB 260 billion, five times as much as in the “Seventh Five Year” Period, 
while during the “Ninth Five Year” Period, ending in 2000, the investment total grew 
to RMB 700 billion, 2.7 times the amount of the previous five years.    The high rate 
of growth has continued through the Tenth Five-Year period. 
 
China has a comprehensive physical reporting system, which makes it 
possible to track urban infrastructure capacity along various dimensions.    Table 6 
shows that the growth in most measures of urban infrastructure provision (and 
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Table 6: Basic Statistics on Urban Infrastructure Coverage 
Item  1990 1995 2000  2002  2003 
Developed areas (sq. km)  12856 19264 22439  25973  28308 
Population density of urban districts (person/sqkm)  279  322  442  754  847 
Total floor space of buildings (100 million sqm)    39.8  57.3  76.6  131.8  140.9 
Per capita water consumption for residential use (ton)  67.9  71.3  95.5  77.8  77.1 
Percentage of population with access to tap water (%)  48  58.7  63.9  77.9  86.2 
Percentage of population with access to gas (%)  19.1  34.3  45.4  67.2  76.7 
Area of paved roads per 1000 population ( sqm)  3.1  4.4  6.1  7.9  9.3 
Length of sewer pipelines per capita (m)  3.9  6.0  6.8  --  -- 
Density of sewer pipelines (km/sqkm)  4.5  5.7  6.3  6.7  7.0 
%  of  Treated  Sewerage  14.9  20.0  34.2 36.5 -- 
Number of public transportation vehicles per 100
population (unit) 
2.2  3.6  5.3 6.7 7.7 
Per capita public green areas (sqm)  1.8  2.5  3.7  5.4  6.5 
Volume of garbage disposal (10000 tons)    6727  10671 11818.  13650  14857 
Sources: China statistical yearbook 2004   
 
Despite this growth, many Chinese experts and policy officials believe that 
urban infrastructure investment lags behind the rate appropriate to the country’s 
growth in urbanization, industrialization, and income level, and that urban 
infrastructure investment will have to accelerate in the future.    33   
 
One key element in this argument is China’s commitment to urbanization as 
the primary domestic growth strategy.    Although China has the most cities with a 
population of at least 1 million of any country in the world (171 in 2002), it remains 
largely a rural nation.    Moreover, as a report of the Research and Development 
Center of the State Council points out, China has industrialized to a far greater extent 
than it has urbanized, and has urbanized faster than it has invested in urban 
infrastructure.
4  China’s  degree  of  urbanization  today corresponds to that of England 
in 1950, the United States in 1911, and Japan in 1950.    If the worldwide 
correspondence between industrialization and urbanization were to hold true in China, 
the country would now be 60% urbanized, instead of just over 40%. 
 
China’s economic growth strategy rests on continued rapid urbanization to 
absorb surplus rural labor.    As Chen Yuan, Governor of China Development Bank, 
has written: 
 
Urbanization is the most important and enduring motive force in stimulating 
consumption and investment in China’s domestic economy today; it is also the engine 
to simultaneously propel our economic and social development.
5 
 
                                                        
4 Xie Fuzhan, “Speeding Up City Infrastructure Development Should Have a Sense of Urgency,” 
(2004), www.china.org.cn/chinese/OP-c/466537.htm 
5 Chen Yuan, “Development Financing and China’s Urbanization” (2005), 
www.cdb.com.cn/english/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=1174    34   
Rapid and even accelerating urbanization will require very high rates of urban 
infrastructure investment to accommodate cities’ population growth while at the same 
time improving coverage and service standards. 
 
By some measures, China’s rate of urban infrastructure investment to date has 
been less robust than it may first seem.    The World Bank’s World Development 
Report of 1994 found that infrastructure investment in developing countries tended to 
average about 50% of total government investment, 20% of total national investment, 
and about 4% of GDP.    “Urban” infrastructure investment—i.e. infrastructure 
investment serving the municipal level--averaged about 3 to 4% of urbanized GDP.   
Table 7 shows that urban infrastructure investment levels in China have been rising 
rapidly over time, but remained a relatively modest share of total national investment 
as of 2000 (note that the urban infrastructure investment ratios in the table are 
calculated relative to total national investment and total national GDP).    The most 
successful cities have made much greater commitments to urban infrastructure 
investment.    Over the Ninth Five-Year Plan period (ending in 2000), Shanghai 
devoted 12.5% of total investment to urban infrastructure and 5.9% of regional GDP.   
In Beijing, 13.7% of total investment went to urban infrastructure, which 
corresponded to 6.3% of regional GDP, more than triple the share from earlier years. 
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Table 7: Urban Infrastructure Investment Ratios 
Year  Ratio to Total Fixed   
Asset Investment 
Ratio to GDP 
1980 1.2% 0.2% 
1985 2.5% 0.7% 
1990 2.7% 0.7% 
1995 4.0% 1.4% 
2000 5.8% 2.1% 
Source:  Construction  Industry  Publication  of China as reported in Fu Tao (2004) 
 
Government experts have estimated that approximately 20 to 30 percent spent 
on urban infrastructure construction during the 10
th Five Year Plan period, ending in 
2005, will be expended by local, provincial, and central governments directly from 
budget (fiscal) resources.    The remainder will be financed by a combination of 
domestic loans, foreign and multilateral loans, revenue from asset earnings and asset 
sales, and various forms of market-based financing. 
 
THE FISCAL FRAMEWORK AND INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING 
OPTIONS 
 
Perhaps the best way to examine the linkage between the national fiscal 
framework and national fiscal policy, on the one hand, and urban infrastructure    36   
financing, on the other, is to look individually at the three broad channels that are 
responsible for the bulk of urban infrastructure financing.    These are: direct budget 
investment from fiscal resources, borrowing, and market-based financing. 
 
Direct Budget Expenditures 
 
Direct budget expenditures on urban infrastructure investment include 
spending at the central, provincial, and local level from fiscal resources.    Because 
urban capital construction is a local (sub-provincial) responsibility, the vast majority 
of spending is done by local governments.    Before 1990, the main funds for urban 
infrastructure construction came from the local urban maintenance and construction 
tax and from public utilities surcharges.    Now, local infrastructure investment in 
principle can be financed from general resources in the local budget, although for 
budget presentation purposes revenue from the urban maintenance and construction 
tax typically is allocated to infrastructure investment.   
. 
As described in Part I, sub-provincial governments have been placed in a 
fiscal squeeze stemming from a downward shift of expenditure responsibilities, an 
inadequate intergovernmental tax-sharing and transfer system, and the tendency of 
provincial governments to hold onto revenues rather than return them to the local 
level. One result has been strong pressure on local governments’ budgets, which in 
turn has diminished the share of local budgets available to finance capital    37   
construction.   
 
These trends have led to a steady decline in the proportion of urban 
infrastructure investment that is financed from direct budget spending or operating 
surplus. Figure 5 shows that the proportion of total urban infrastructure construction 
financed by budgetary funds decreased from 50% in 1991 to 29% in 2001.    The 
decline has continued thereafter, and is projected to continue into the future. 
  


















State budgetary appropriation proportion
 Source  :  Authors  calculations  
 
A second source of direct public financing is off-budget fees.    As noted in 
Part I, central authorities have vigorously sought to rein in local fees, marked by 
periodic initiatives since 1994 (e.g., in 1996 and 2001) to limit the number of 
authorized fees to a restricted list and bring them within the formal revenue reporting 
system.    Most of these fees did not take the form of service charges or user fees for 
service consumption (which have been increasing at central government urging), but    38   
were arbitrary fees levied on such items as construction permits and various 
“authorizations’ for domestic and international business operations.    Nonetheless, 
they provided a source of unrestricted local income that often was channeled into 
infrastructure investment.    The growth of fees used for infrastructure finance up to 
the 1994 intergovernmental fiscal reform and the subsequent sharp fall-off is shown in 
Figure 6. 
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The financing gap created by the decline in direct budgetary spending on 
urban infrastructure has been filled primarily by borrowing.    In 1986, domestic bank 
lending for urban infrastructure totaled only RMB 0.32 billion accounting for 2.4% of 
total urban infrastructure investment.    As Figure 7 makes clear, the share of 
investment financed by borrowing declined up to the 1994 fiscal reform, then began    39   
to explode.    Although exact figures for post 2001 are not available, it is clear that 
borrowing volumes have continued to rise rapidly thereafter.    By 2001, more than 
60% of the cities in China had infrastructure loans from banks or outstanding loan 
applications. The total banking-sector debt of local governmental units for urban 
infrastructure stood at RMB 74.2 billion in 2001, up 23 fold in just a decade.    Use of 
the banking sector to finance urban infrastructure investment was encouraged by 
national policy, which identified the urban infrastructure sector as a top priority for 
lending by banks, all of which were then owned by the State. 
 

















Source : Authors calculations   
 
Central government borrowing and on-lending to local 
governments for infrastructure investment   
 
Bank borrowing has not been the only the type of debt financing.    The 
national government also issued so-called infrastructure bonds, and passed on the    40   
proceeds to provincial and local governments, as a blend of on-lending and grants.   
From 1998 to 2004, China issued long-term construction national debt of RMB 910 
billion, of which RMB131.7 billion (roughly US$16 billion)
6  was for urban 
infrastructure financing.    The money was used to build almost 2000 projects, 
including sewage and garbage disposal, water supply, and gas and heating in 28 
provinces.    Funds were steered toward poorer regions, especially those in the 
Western development area, and toward projects, especially those involving 
environmental protection, that could not recover costs through service charges or 
attract investment financing from the market.   
 
Under the newly announced “prudent” fiscal policy, national government will 
substantially reduce debt issuance for urban infrastructure investment purposes. In 
fact, funds from national debt are now supposed to be used only to complete 
construction in progress, and not to finance new projects. This change in national 
policy will severely affect the financing capacity of many local governments, 
especially those in the underdeveloped provinces of western China, where 
market-based financing is difficult to mobilize. 
 
Structural Problems with Debt Financing 
 
The risks created by debt financing go beyond the sheer volume of 
sub-national debt.    The bulk of bank loans have been provided by commercial banks.   
                                                        
6  Exchange Rate used is 1$=RMB 8.23      41   
Although the maturity period of commercial bank loans for local infrastructure 
investment has gradually been extended, typical loans still do not exceed five to eight 
years.    Even economically remunerative infrastructure investment projects cannot 
recover costs over such a short period, so local government must roll over their loans 
rather than repay them.    From local governments’ perspective, rolling over shorter 
term infrastructure loans was a more viable proposition when local commercial bank 
branches were closely tied politically to local governments, and the entire banking 
system had planning targets for urban infrastructure investment to fulfill.    Now, as 
part of financial de-regulation, the Peoples Bank of China no longer establishes 
sectoral lending plans for banks.    Banks have been required to heighten credit 
standards and prodded to clean up non-performing loans.    Local governments’ 
political control over local loans has been somewhat weakened in the effort to 
strengthen banks’ balance sheets. Thus, the risk to local governments that old loans 
cannot be rolled over, and that debt financing for new projects cannot be obtained, is 
greater than before.    From the banking side, the fact that local government loans 
were routinely rolled over, rather than required to be re-paid, has hidden the true 
degree of non-performing loans, which is now coming to light. 
 
China Development Bank (CDB), as a long-term policy bank, stands out 
against this sectoral backdrop.    CDB regularly makes urban infrastructure loans of 
15-20 years, or even longer, and has been a leader in identifying new types of revenue 
streams that can enhance local creditworthiness.    42   
Central government on-lending for infrastructure investment from nationally 
issued bonds has been subjected to a variety of abuses, which the Ministry of Finance 
recognized in deciding to cut back the program.    Local and provincial governments 
often obtained financing on the premise that it would be used to invest in 
environmental projects and other social projects unable to generate a full economic 
return, then would switch to economic development projects once the financing was 
in hand.    Public tendering was circumvented.    Provinces (and the local governments 
that received funds from them) would obtain funds as “loans,” then plead inability to 
repay and succeed in getting re-payment waived.
7 
 
In part because of the legacy of state planning and state-directed financing of 
plans, the distinction between “loans” that must be repaid, and grants or transfers that 
are not to be repaid, has not been fully established at the sub-national level.   
Provincial and local governments, especially in laggard regions, continue to treat loan 
repayment to the central government as a matter of political negotiation rather than 
commercial obligation.    This injects an element of endemic risk into sub-national 
debt that central authorities now are trying to eliminate. 
 
Fear of the inability to control sub-national debt risk also has made the central 
                                                        
7  See Fu Tao, “Local Credit Systems for Urban Environmental Infrastructure in China,” paper prepared 
for OECD (2004) and Wang, YX, Fang, Z., Ji, M, Huang, JL and Tan L , “A Study on the 
Multi-Channel Investment in China:  Urban Environmental Infrastructure Construction in China,” 
Paper for Proceeding of the First Task Force Meeting for “Financial Mechanisms for Environmental 
Protection,” China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (Nov. 
2003)    43   
government unwilling to allow rule-based issuance of municipal bonds.    All 
proposed local bonds must be individually approved, both by the next higher level of 
government and by the State Development and Reform Commission.    Most such 
proposals are denied, or simply not acted upon.    Local governments with strong 
economic bases, such as Shanghai, have sought bond approvals for years, but have 




“Marketization” is the term used in China for mobilizing capital from the 
private or social sector to invest in urban infrastructure.    National planning calls for 
generating larger shares of financing from this mode to replace the declining share of 
direct fiscal investment and in recognition of the prudential constraints on borrowing.     
 
In the first generation of “marketization”, emphasis was placed on land 
leasing—i.e., the sale to private developers of land development and leasing rights 
owned by local government.    Leasing rights, though good for a specified time period 
(typically 50 years in the case of commercial property), are sold up-front as a cash 
transaction.    Proceeds from land leasing have been used primarily to finance 
infrastructure construction.    In some cities, land sales have been able to finance more 
than 100% of all infrastructure investment, year in and year out, over a period of 
many years.    In fact, during the last decade and a half, land leasing has been the    44   
principal source of urban infrastructure investment finance in larger cities.    However, 
its importance has declined of late in those cities that were the first to enter the market, 
because of the decline in the supply of remaining land available for lease. 
 
“Marketization” strategy is now moving toward a greater focus on 
infrastructure assets. This may take the form of selling existing assets (like water 
treatment plants and bridges) to the private sector for specific periods of ownership, 
but more significantly involves attracting private capital to finance new construction 
of assets.    A July 2004 policy pronouncement by the central government State 
Council, “Decision on Investment and Organizational Reform,” formally reiterated 
the policy of approving social (private) capital investment in infrastructure and public 
utilities, and endorsed specific measures that would be necessary for implementing 
this broad policy, such as moving toward tariff rates that include an adequate return to 
capital and coverage of debt service, providing preferential tax treatment for private 
investment in urban infrastructure, and giving private investors in network systems 
(like wastewater collection and treatment) preferential rights to use network capacity 
for their own industrial and commercial projects. 
 
Public policy in the short run has been motivated by a straightforward desire 
to mobilize financing for urban infrastructure investment.    However, the 
marketization movement has opened up a broader discussion of how the urban 
infrastructure sector should be organized and how infrastructure services should be    45   
paid for. 
 
Role of Urban Development and Investment Companies 
 
According to public goods theory, the government should explicitly classify 
infrastructure into three different categories: infrastructure that can be operated 
profitably, quasi-profitable infrastructure, and infrastructure that is inherently 
non-profitable because of its public goods nature.    Moreover, the scope of profitable 
infrastructure—i.e., infrastructure that can be operated on a profitable basis through 
service charges or other financial means—should be expanded as the market economy 
grows and as consumer ability to pay increases.    For non-profitable infrastructure, 
government will remain the main financing body and investor.    However, for 
profitable and quasi-profitable infrastructure, business enterprises should become the 
main builders and operators. Profitable infrastructure can stand on its own with 
appropriate service pricing; quasi-profitable infrastructure will need targeted 
government subsidies to become competitive. 
 
The present urban infrastructure management system in China runs together 
these three infrastructure categories.    Profitable infrastructure is combined with 
non-profitable infrastructure under the management of a single, monopoly 
State-Owned Enterprise, without clear guidelines differentiating the way the different 
types of infrastructure will be operated or financed.    Each city has an Urban    46   
Development and Investment Company (UDIC, or City Development and 
Construction Company, as it is sometimes translated), whose function is to (i) 
mobilize financing for new infrastructure construction of all kinds, (ii) carry out 
construction of new infrastructure, and (iii) oversee the operation of existing 
infrastructure assets, running the gamut from mass transit systems to wastewater 
treatment plants, and water supply to trash collection and disposal. 
 
This monopoly company is the juridical person that acts on behalf of the 
government to borrow funds from banks and other sources, issue bonds when allowed 
to do so, raise capital from Trusts and other special purpose vehicles, enter into joint 
ventures with private companies for infrastructure development, sell local 
infrastructure assets, assemble land packages for sale and development, serve as the 
implementing body for international loan programs, and oversee actual service 
delivery from the assets it owns, typically drawing upon complex cross-subsidization 
arrangements to keep all of its activities afloat. 
 
UDICs were established in most cities at the end of the 1990s or even later, in 
response to a central government directive that responsibility for asset and liability 
management should be taken away from municipal governments and placed in the 
hands of specialized local enterprises.    However, further unbundling is required.   
Potentially profitable and quasi-profitable infrastructure functions can be operated on 
a standalone basis that allows competition from private suppliers and can attract    47   
private capital for new ventures.    UDICs will continue to have responsibility for the 
overall physical development of the city, and the financing and infrastructure 
strategies that are necessary to accomplish planning objectives.    However, in 
changing from the plan-oriented economy to the market-oriented economy, a 
fundamental requirement is to eliminate the UDICs’ monopoly over all phases of 
infrastructure development and operation and all types of infrastructure.    UDIC’s job, 
in addition to overall infrastructure development strategy, should be to operate and 
upgrade those infrastructure services that are inherently unprofitable because of their 
public goods nature, while spinning off profitable and quasi-profitable infrastructure 
to other institutions that can participate in market-based competition. 
 
Some UDICs have begun the unbundling process.    The Shanghai Municipal 
UDIC, for example, has spun off a separate institution to invest in development of 
water and wastewater assets and negotiate agreements with private investors for new 
projects in the sector.    Additional unbundling is in process.
8 
 
Infrastructure Revenue Streams 
 
Whether capital funds are mobilized in the form of direct private investment or 
market-based loans, the economics of infrastructure investment is based on the 
                                                        
8 See Gao Guo Fu, “Urban Infrastructure Investment and Financing” Paper presented at the 
Practitioners’ Conference on Mobilizing Urban Infrastructure Finance in a Fiscally Responsible 
Framework: Lessons from Brazil, China, India, Poland and South Africa” January 2005. 
http://www.worldbank.org/uifconference/ 
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revenue streams that are generated.    Over the past 15 years, the most prolific and 
dependable revenue streams have been those attached to land.    Special requirements 
or incentives for land developers to invest in associated off-site infrastructure have 
been another important source of infrastructure  investment.  The  economic  value  of 
urban land is widely recognized in China, and the conversion of land-leasing rights or 
land development rights into infrastructure finance is widely practiced. 
 
It has proved more difficult to implement market-based reforms of 
infrastructure service tariffs, like water tariffs, wastewater treatment charges, and 
garbage collection and disposal fees.    The State Development and Reform 
Commission in October 2002 issued a circular on urban tariffs, stating that “cities 
with existing wastewater and garbage treatment facilities shall start to immediately 
charge a treatment tariff,” and that all other cities should do so before the end of 2003.   
Cities that had water, trash collection, wastewater treatment, and trash disposal tariffs 
were given a strict timetable for moving to tariff schedules that “shall cover 
operations cost and a reasonable investment return.”    The purpose of the circular was 
specifically to make these urban infrastructure sectors attractive to private capital, so 
that investors could earn a satisfactory profit and lenders could have an adequate 
margin for payment of debt service. 
 
In practice, almost all cities have failed to adopt full cost-recovery pricing for 
these basic services.    Even the national government has backtracked.    In 2004, it    49   
issued another circular prohibiting cities from raising service fees, as an 
inflation-fighting measure.    Political reluctance to increase basic service fees has 
caused cities to look to private developers and larger commercial activities for 
alternative revenue streams that could be capitalized into investment financing.    In 
its effort to clean up the Suzhou River, for example, the Shanghai Municipal 
Government granted project implementing agencies the right to collect a special 
drainage assessment charge from those who discharged into the river, creating a 
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PART III 
CONCLUSION:  A  POLICY  AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 
 
In looking to the future, it will be necessary to establish a more supportive 
fiscal framework for urban infrastructure investment that serves both economically 
strong and weaker local governments.    The basic elements of such a reform package 
are: 
 
The first is to better match expenditure responsibilities and fiscal ability. 
Along with development of the market-oriented economy, the marketability of urban 
infrastructure investment has been enhanced greatly, but local governments cannot 
withdraw from the infrastructure construction domain completely.    They require 
fiscal resources commensurate with their expenditure obligations. In China the 
vertical fiscal imbalance has not been resolved.    Fiscal revenues are centralized 
upward, so that outside of the biggest cities fiscal resources for infrastructure 
construction at the local level are extremely limited. Addressing this problem will 
require enlarging the scope of general transfers aimed at narrowing differentials in 
fiscal capacity, supplemented by special subsidies to meet specified standards for city 
infrastructure construction. 
 
  Even before implementing new fiscal transfers, however, it is imperative to    51   
more precisely distinguish each level of government’s responsibilities in infrastructure 
provision and finance.    At present, weaker local governments are being asked to 
handle more functions than they possibly can manage from existing resources. 
 
Second, local governments’ fiscal autonomy should gradually be strengthened. 
Legislative power over local taxes now rests with the central government. The power 
to establish tax rates, and modify the local tax and fee structure, should be gradually 
released downward to local governments, within centrally determined limits, so that 
they can generate their own revenues according to the local development level and the 
local development strategy.    This policy will primarily benefit rapidly growing cities 
with strong economic bases. 
 
Third, the national Budget Law should be modified to allow local 
governments (or the Urban Development Investment Companies acting on their 
behalf) to raise financing from the capital market through bond issuance. At present, 
the intergovernmental systems of budget surveillance and control are inadequate to 
permit generalized access to a municipal bond market.    However, certain cities 
whose economies, fiscal revenues, and management experience are stronger (such as 
Beijing and Shanghai) should be allowed to issue bonds for city construction, subject 
to general rules rather than case-by-case approval, as an experiment that, if successful, 
could be broadened to other cities. 
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Fourth, the rules for converting land assets into infrastructure finance should 
be standardized.    For the last decade and a half, land leasing has been the principal 
source of urban infrastructure financing in China’s big cities.    However, 
municipalities’ manipulation of land markets has led to important development 
distortions, as municipalities began to act like profit-maximizing land monopolists.   
The national government must continue to clarify the rules for land acquisition and 
land disposition by municipal authorities.   
 
Finally the framework for mobilizing capital from the social or private sector 
needs to be solidified. The present level of marketability in China has made it possible 
for private capital to access the city infrastructure domain.    However, if private 
capital is to play the expansive role projected for it in the future, service tariffs for 
infrastructure must be increased to include capital costs and revenue streams must 
become fully reliable.    Special incentives, like tax breaks for infrastructure 
investment, can help at the margin, but private investment on the scale envisioned will 
require that a significant portion of the urban infrastructure “industry” be placed on a 
routinely profitable basis, supported by service charges. 
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